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CASES NOTED
clusive evidence of non-paternity, the wording of its decision should serve
to discourage results contrary to the tests. It is submitted that enactment
of model statutes such as the one involved here would assist other en-
lightened courts in rendering similiarly laudable decisions.
GAMING - FUNDS SEIZED BY THE STATE
Defendants, sheriff and his deputies, raided plaintiffs' games and took
the monies from the gambling tables as evidence. Plaintiffs pleaded guilty
to gambling, paid their fines and brought this suit to recover the monies
taken. A prayer by the county for forfeiture was consolidated with this
suit. The trial court denied recovery, and also found a forfeiture contrary
to statute.' On appeal, denial of plaintiffs' right to recover was affirmed.
Held, the courts will neither aid any party whose claim is grounded in an
illegal contract or purpose, even though the suit is against one not a party
thereto, nor direct the ultimate disposition of the seized monies in face
of a statute not allowing forfeiture. Lee On v. Long, 234 P.2d 9 (Cal.
1951).
Since abolition of the early comnmon law forfeiture of all property
by conviction for a felony,2 the courts never have considered that a plaintiff
lost all his rights to the use of the courts for matters not connected with
his past illegal activity. 3 Although a violator must suffer his penalties, le
is otherwvise under the protection of the law and can demand all its remedies.'
However, the courts have steadfastly refused to aid any plaintiff to enforce
an illegal contract or purpose either as against the other party to the wrong, 5
or against one not a party where the action is necessarily founded in such
a contract or purpose." The conflict in the decisions seems to arise over
the question: when is the action founded in the illegality of the contract
or purpose? An action is not foundcd in the illegality if the plaintiff's
pleading establishes a prima facie case without mentioning the illegal con-
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2604 (1949): "No conviction of any person for crime works
any forfeiture of any property except in cases in which a forfeiture is expressly imposed
by law ... "
2. Attainder, which includes corruption of blood, forfeiture and loss of civil rights, is
not known in modern law. See Howard v. State, 28 Ariz. 433, 434, 237 Pac. 203, 204
(1925).
3. E.g., Conrioly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1901); Cook v. Ball, 144
F.2d 423 (7th-Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 761 (1945).
4. Welch v. Wesson, 71 Mass. (6 Gray) 505 (1856).
5. E.g., McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639 (1899); REsTA'rEMN'r, CONTRACTS, §
598 (1932). This broad principle, based on the maxim in Nari delicto potior est conditis
defendentis et possidentis, is claimed to have originated from the decision of "The High-
wayinan's Case", Everet v. Williams (1725), noted in 9 L. Q. Rav. 197 (1893) (an ac-
counting between highwaymen). "The vice of a maxim is that sometimes lawyers andjudges are apt to seize on it to govern cases to which if more critically examined it should
not be applied." In re Brown's Estate, 147 Kan. 395, 399, 76 P.2d 857, 860 (1938).
6. E.g., Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., 117 Tenn. 263, 98 S.W. 178 (1906). Contra:
Matta v. Katsoulas, 192 Wis. 212, 212 N.W. 261 (1927).
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tract or purpose;7 if plaintiff can sue without showing that he has broken
the laws;8 if plaintiff's violation is merely collateral to the cause of action;
or if the plaintiff does not require essential aid from the illegality to
establish his case.'* In relation to this most litigated point the courts thus
have found that plaintiff can recover money in an illegal slot machine;"
an automobile in the hands of a bailee who received it for the winner of
an illegal raffle; 12 money placed in the hands of an agent for use in a
gambling game and seized as evidence;' 3 and that plaintiff can receive
damages for a tort occurring between drivers in an illegal race.'4 However,
the courts have denied recovery where plaintiff had to assume two incon-
sistent positions to avoid the stigma of illegality;' 5 where the court deemed
that the property had become part of the illegal device;' where recovery
would deprive the state of its just revenue;' 7 and where the money claimed
was an integrant of the illegal transaction and could be forfeited.' "
None of those bases for denying recovery existed in the noted ease
which concerned stakes that were lawfully seized by the state for evi-
dentiary purposes, yet retained after the reason for the bailment had
terminated. The present decision placed principal reliance upon two cases'9
which can be distinguished upon their facts. In those cases it was neces-
sarily the basis of the plaintiffs' claims that they disclose their illegal
activities since they were attempting to recover tax monies that would have
been rightfully assessed if their businesses had been legal rather than
merely "fronts". They were thus compelled to reveal two inconsistent
positions. The noted case involved no need to maintain inconsistent posi-
tions; on the contrary, these plaintiffs had previously admitted their guilt
and paid their fine which was all that was authorized by statute.20 Another
case2' heavily relied upon can be distinguished because it concerned monies
7. Kearney v. Webb, 278 Ill. 17, 115 N.E. 844 (1917). ..Contra: McManus v.
Fulton, 85 Mont. 170, 278 Pac. 126 (1929).
8. Schohoney v, Quincy, 0. & K. C. R.R., 231 Mo. 131, 132 S.W. 1059 (1910),
writ of error dismissed, 223 U.S. 705 (1911).
9. National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wis. 352, 56 N.W.
864 (1893).
10, Capps v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 197 Miss. 4, 19 So.2d 491 (1944).
11, Chappell v. Stapleton, 58 Ga. App. 138, 178 S.E. 109 (1938).
12, Matta v. Katsoulas, supra note 6.
13. Kearney v. Webb, supra note 7.
14, Welch v. \Vesson, supra note 4.
15. Asher v. Johnson, 26 Cal. App.2d 403, 79 P.2d 457 (1938).
16. Dorrell v. Clark, 90 Mont. 585, 4 P.2d 712 (1931).
17, Dufek v. Harrison County, 289 S.W. 741 (Tex. 1926).
18. Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.I.S. 22, 65 A.2d 542 (1949) (num-
bers game); Fairmont Engine Co. v. Montgomery County, 135 Pa. 367, 5 A.2d 419
(1939) (lottery).
19. Asher v. Johnson, supra note 15; Shur v. Johnson, 2 Cal. App.2d 680, 38 P.2d
844 (1934). (Both of these cases are criticized in 29 Cu. L. REv. 418, 422 [19411,
. udicially created and imposed penalty for carrying on the unlawful business.").
20. CAL. PFN. ConE § 330 (1949). (Note that maximum fine under this section is
$500 and the gambling funds here retained by the state amount to $6,248.35).
21, Dorrell v. Clark, supra note 16 (distinguished in Lee On v. Long, 223 P.2d 894,
(Cal. 1950), same case as noted case on appeal to lower court holding contra).
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in confiscated slot machines which were held to have become part of the
illegal device and thus subject to forfeiture; whereas in the instant case the
court admitted that a statute 2 forbids forfeiture of the gambling funds
involved. 23 Rather than viewing the illegal act as a collateral matter the
court here held that the reason for the seizure was a necessary element of the
plaintiff's case and therefore denied recovery.
The instant decision when thus stripped of its allegedly supporting
authority seems to have only public policy24 to justify new law creating, in
effect, a forfeiture in contravention of statute.25  It is submitted that the
effect of this Draconian ruling will be to predicate the penalty of the gambler
on the vigilance of the law-enforcement officers and on the stake of the
game, regardless of any statute regulating such penalties predicated upon
the grade of immorality or frequency of violation. ", Also, following the
holding to its logical conclusion, it may even become possible for the gov-
ernment to refuse to deliver up an auto towed to the city pound in pursu-
ance of modern parking ordinances.27 All this may result without any answer
to the question tactfully evaded in the decision: just what can be done with
this money?25
ZONING-DISCONTINUANCE OF NONCONFORMING USE
The village clerk refused a permit to reopen a gasoline service station on
petitioner's premises, located in a residential zone. Held, a zoning ordinance
prohibiting resumption of a nonconforming use discontinued 12 or more
months is constitutional. Franmore Realty Corp. v. LeBoeuf, 104 N.Y.S.2d
247 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
A nonconforming use' is included in those "bundles of rights"12 which
22. CAL. PEN. CoDE, suPra note 1.
23. Lee On v. Long, 234 P.2d 9, 11 (Cal. 1951).
24. Possibly influenced by the semi-hysteria created by the disclosures of the wide-
spread prevalency and corruption of gambling as exposed by the Senate Crime investigation
Committee (popularly, Kefauver Committee) created by Sen. Res. 202, introduced, 96
CoNe. REc. 6149 (1950).
25. As to whether this can be construed as a forfeiture, see opinion of Justice Augus-
tus N. Hand in Judson v. Buckley, 130 F.2d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 1942): "Suit for recovery
[is] not barred . . . where the res sought to be recovered is held in escrow ...so that
a refusal to act in favor of the complainant will amount to an affirmative action in favor
of the other party."
26. Will not the professional gambler be "penalized" less, since the custom of the
profession is to use chips?
27. As suggested by the dissenting opinion, Lee On v. Long, supra note 23, at 13.
28. Such as, i. e., can the state have the use of the money? Th interest? Would
it be a crine if the plaintiffs were to regain possession of this money by self help? And
what are the present responsibilities of the holder of this money?
1. A nonconforming use is a lawful use existing on the effective date of the zoning
restriction and continuing since that time in nonconformance to the ordinance. Darling
v. Zoning Board of Adiustment of City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 428, 54 A.2d 829
(1947); Appeal of -laller Baking Co., 295 Pa. 257, 145 A. 77 (1928). 8 McQuz.LAN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.185 (3d ed. 1950). See Beyer v. Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore, 182 Md. 444, 34 A.2d 765 (1943).
2. POUND & PLUGINETT, READINGS ON TIlE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MoN LAw 638 (3d ed. 1927).
